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NOTES AND COMMENT
Attorneys: Disbarment of Attorneys: Good Moral Character.
Section i and 13, article VII, of the Wisconsin Constitution, rela-
tive to the impeachment of civil officers and the removal of judges of
the Supreme or Circuit Court, are inapplicable in determining the power
of the Supreme Court to disbar the judge of the Superior Court of Dane
County, in that it would also result in his removal from office as judge,
since such Superior Court, which was created by ch. 136 of the Laws
of 1917, and amended by ch. 56 of the Laws of I919 and ch. 7
of the Laws of 1925, is not a constitutional court, so as to bring the
judge thereof within the protection of the constitutional provision rela-
tive to removal from office. This rule and many others, relative to the
disbarment of attorneys and the removal of judges, have been laid down
in the case of In re , 193 Wis., 602, 214 N.W. 379.
This case, the facts, of which are like the setting of a novel, has
been the topic of discussion in many of the newspapers in the State.
These facts may be found in the official report.
The court discussed at great length and brought out many phases of
ethics in the profession. "The power to discipline and disbar attorneys
at law is an inherent power of courts." The court further said,"One's
morality or lack of morality is revealed by general conduct. One may
lack morality in a great many ways. Where this lack of morality has
no relation to, and does not affect, his duties and responsibilities as an
attorney at law, the delinquencies are generally overlooked by the courts.
But where there is lacking honesty, probity, integrity, and fidelity to
trusts reposed in him, it matters not whether the lack of such virtues
is revealed in transactions with clients, in the conduct of a lawsuit, or
essential on the part of those who are to exercise the privileges and
in any other business dealing or relation. These qualities are highly
essential on the part of those who are to exercise the privileges and
responsibilities of members of the bar. When the lack of them becomes
apparent, no matter what the character of the deal or transaction that
may f urnish the evidence, it becomes the duty of the court to purge
its roster of an unreliable member ..... .No amount of credulity can
exonerate the respondent of a knowledge of the general lawless condi-
tions of that particular neighborhood. To impute to him a lack of
that knowledge would be to accuse him of the most childlike simplicity."
The requisite qualification of one holding the office of an attorney
at law shall be good moral character, in so far as it relates to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at law is
a continuous qualification. If an attorney at law, by or through his
acts betrays a lack of moral qualifications demanded of attorneys,
it is the duty of the court to strike his name from the roll of its
attorneys, notwithstanding the facts that his misconduct might
have been when he was a judge, and bore no relations to his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the bar. The supreme court has power
to suspend attorneys for an indefinite period for disciplinary purposes
and as a restraining influence upon others. And that power or duty
of the court to disbar an attorney on a showing of a lack of moral
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qualifications should not be affected by the fact that the attorney may be
a judge or be holding a public office.
The words of Mr. Chief Justice Winslow can best express the pur-
pose for and the reason behind cases such as the one just reported:
"Equal and exact justice has been the passionate demand of the
human soul since man first wronged his fellowman; it has been the
dream of the philosopher, the aim of the lawgiver, the supreme en-
deavor of the judge, the ultimate test of every government and every
civilization. Pain and suffering may be bravely met, poverty and
want endured without complaint, the daily round of exacting toil taken
up with cheerful heart, but the soul of man in all ages has bitterly cried
out against injustice and insistently demanded that it must not be.
Every government past and present may be known and properly judged
by the quality of the justice administered by its courts. The nearer
the approach to ideal and perfect justice in the courts, the nearer the
approach to Utopia in the government."
AL WATSON, '28
Automobiles Parking on Highways: Necessary Repairs.
No parking on any public highway! What does this fnean? The
problem has been before our courts on different occasions and has
been partially settled. Now it is definitely and correctly determined
by the decision in Long v. Steffen. 1 This case was started by a widow
as administratrix of the estate of her husband who died from injuries
resulting from the collision of the defendant's car with the truck of
the deceased. The deceased was driving his truck north on Highway
No. 17. The truck became disabled by a flat tire on the left rear wheel
and the deceased drove upon the gravel shoulder bordering the con-
crete so that he could park and repair the tire. He was unable to
repair the tire while on the gravel shoulder because there had been
frequent rains and the gravel was so saturated as to make it unfit for
use. With the aid of some planks, the deceased managed to drive the
truck up on the concrete portion of the highway. He parked it to
the extreme right hand side of the road and left both the front and
rear lights burning. Furthermore, the load on the truck was covered
with a white canvass which witnesses state could be easily seen from
a distance, and the father of the deceased was on guard to warn ap-
proaching cars. The deceased removed the tire and carried it about
six feet in front of the truck so that he could repair it by the head-
lights of the truck. The defendant was also traveling north on this
highway and ran into the parked truck with such terrific force that the
truck was thrown forward and sideways so as to hit the deceased and
then landed twenty-five feet away in an enbankment. The defendant
claimed to have been blinded by the glare of the headlights of on-
coming cars. This presents the question whether the defendant is re-
sponsible for the deceased's injuries causing his death or was the
deceased guilty of contributory negligence?
Our Supreme Court held in Schacht v. Quick2 that "a traveler has
the right to make reasonable use of the highway for the examination
Wis. - ; 215 N.W. 892.
1 I78 Wis. 330; i9o N.W. 89.
